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Reducing Medical Error
U.S. health care is touted as the best in the world,
though few would argue that a lucid system is in place
or deny that there are major disparities in access as well
as outcomes. Despite these recognized shortcomings,
however, the phenomenal growth of U.S. medical
knowledge and technological capacity has led most to
assume that quality of care is at an all-time high. This is
probably true in the aggregate, but for a variety of
reasons recent years have brought increasing scrutiny to
the subject.
In the years when health care costs were rising in
double-digit leaps, most complaints about quality were
voiced by purchasers who worried that fee-for-service
incentives led to the delivery of more care than was
necessary, sometimes with negative results. When the
incentives began to change under managed care,
concerns were heard from consumers unhappy with the
resulting constraints on service.
It is not surprising, then, that much recent legislative
attention at both state and federal levels has focused on
protecting beneficiaries who fear they will not receive
the services that were bargained or contracted for,
especially when many of them are paying a considerably larger portion of benefit costs than previously.
While beneficiaries and their advocates are concerned
about access to state-of-the-art technology and procedures (sometimes in advance of proven effectiveness),
relatively little attention has been paid to whether
service delivery is executed as it should be. Not many
people, it appears, appreciate how frequently errors
occur, how large the discrepancies may be among
institutions and providers, and how stubborn the obstacles to improvement.
As Michael L. Millenson observed in his 1997 book,
Demanding Medical Excellence, “the frightening reality
is that medical mistakes of all types are not unusual.”1
Research over several decades bears witness to the truth
of this statement. The 1991 Harvard Medical Practice
Study, for example, found that 4 percent of hospitalized
patients in New York State suffered injuries stemming
from treatment. Further, fully two-thirds of these
iatrogenic injuries were caused by errors, and nearly 14
percent of them were fatal.
Extrapolating from the New York data, Harvard
School of Public Health researcher Lucian L. Leape,
M.D., estimated that 180,000 people in the United
States die each year of iatrogenic injury—the equiva-

lent, he wrote, of three jumbo-jet crashes every two
days.2 Other research has shown that 6.5 percent of
non-obstetrical adult patients admitted to two teaching
hospitals experienced an adverse drug event (ADE)—
such as the wrong dose, a prescription for a drug to
which they were allergic, or drug interaction—of which
28 percent were preventable.3 Potential ADEs for
another 5.5 percent of patients were intercepted before
the drug was administered.
Reducing error rates is not a matter of drafting a bill
and demanding compliance, as few Americans would
welcome the prospect of set-in-statute clinical practice
standards. Moreover, a legislative mandate to stop making
mistakes cannot address the systemic complexities that
form the context for error. However, some researchsupported progress is observable; a variety of initiatives
are under way in both the private and public sectors to
promote quality care and reduce medical error.
This Forum session will address the opportunities for
a systems-based approach to error reduction, noting the
prevalence of errors, what it takes to identify them, and
how they might be prevented through restructuring the
delivery environment and retraining. It will consider how
the latter approach has been used in the aviation arena and
allow the audience to draw some parallels for the respective roles of health plans, providers, consumers, and
policymakers interested in improving patient safety.
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BACKGROUND
It was in 1969 that John E. Wennberg, M.D., and
Dartmouth colleagues first drew attention to the wide
variation in medical care delivery across the country.4
Thirty years later, Wennberg is still reporting disparities,
such as the geographic variation in the proportion of
breast cancer patients who receive breast-conserving
surgery (less than 1 percent in some areas to over 50
percent in others), even though evidence shows this
surgery to be as effective as radical mastectomy in terms
of life expectancy.5 The duration and persistence of
practice variations indicate that they are not a function of
managed care. To those who would point fingers at
today’s health plans, Robert Brook of RAND offers the
reminder, “Managed care is not the problem. Quality is.”6
But consensus is emerging that attention is urgently
needed on a matter that cuts across treatment of all
diseases and conditions, namely, reducing medical error.
Eliminating needless peril and suffering obviously is a
boon to patients, as well as to medical personnel whose
training and practice adjure them to “do no harm.” Cost
is also a consideration, in that catching errors before
injury occurs obviates the need to undertake corrective
treatment procedures or to keep a patient in the hospital
longer in order to recover from damage done during
treatment. Adverse drug events in the hospital have been
associated with an average 2.2-day additional length of
stay and a cost increment of $3,244.7
To err is human, goes the old saw, and to be human
is to make errors. Those who study the role of human
factors in complex systems believe that the propensity to
error can be mitigated by properly designed systems and
safeguards. Conversely, errors may be rendered all but
inevitable by badly designed systems. As Leape told the
President’s Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry in 1997,
Human beings make mistakes because the systems,
tasks, and processes they work in are poorly designed.
Two medications with similar names or similar labels
are an accident waiting to happen. Working double
shifts or having twice as many patients to take care of
is an accident waiting to happen.

A seemingly simple error may have a variety of root
causes, or a variety of errors may be traced to the
same source.
Health care delivery today entails complicated
technology and numerous interactions among health
care practitioners. There are many opportunities for
things to go wrong and a good chance that the exact
cause will not be pinpointed. In his classic 1994 article,

“Error in Medicine,” Leape suggested that, given the
complex nature of medical practice and the multitude of
interventions that each patient receives—the average in
a 1989 study of an intensive care unit was 178 per
day—a high error rate may not be surprising. This
complexity also implies that the traditional pursuit of
error-free individual performance, with blame and
punishment for any lapse, may be an outmoded approach. While the individual in such an atmosphere
may learn from mistakes and their aftermath, the lesson
tends to be private; as Leape says in illustration,
“Concentrating on one individual’s defective knowledge improves the performance of one physician
regarding one drug.”8 Incident analyses that stop with
the finding “human error” are inadequate responses to
a complex systemic problem.

Human Factors Research
Human factors research emerged as a discipline in
response to the immense technological changes that
occurred during and after World War II. Human factors
specialists have studied the interface of human and
machine in complex operating environments, such as
airplane cockpits and nuclear power plant control
rooms. They have observed that many errors are caused
by flawed interface design and by complex interactions
involving human operators. The precipitating event for
disaster may be a relatively trivial malfunction or an
external factor—even the weather. But more often than
not, researchers say, a disaster occurs when a set of
latent system features actively combine in an unexpected combination or sequence.
Researchers point out that enhanced safety really
begins with efforts to understand not just the sources of
failure, but also the sources of success. In fact, in spite
of complexity and system design flaws, accidents are
the exception rather than the rule; there are many more
opportunities for failure than actual instances of it. That
is, health care personnel do not make most of the
mistakes they are “set up” to make.
Health care in the United States is a mix of models,
styles, and stages. From financing arrangements to
evolving scientific technology to relationships, change
is a daily occurrence. Yet imposing or eliciting a
particular change is still challenging. With the variety
of care arrangements in operation, from solo fee-forservice to highly managed systems, is there a quality
improvement strategy that can apply to all? Or is there
a model available that can be adapted to health care?
With respect to systemic quality improvement, what
lessons do other disciplines offer?
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Drawing Lessons from Aviation
One field in which human factors research has been
particularly fertile is aviation. Comparisons of medicine
and aviation raise interesting questions and suggest
mechanisms and attitudes that medical facilities might
consider. The comparison begins, perhaps, with the
similarities between pilots and doctors: highly trained
technically, accustomed to view themselves as bearers
of ultimate authority (and responsibility), independent
yet increasingly dependent on others of varying skill
levels. Some researchers have focused on the similarities in pilots’ and doctors’ training and the demands
they now face. Both are trained as individuals whose
independent decisionmaking is critical, and yet—for
optimal performance—they must operate as part of a
team. As a pilot will not be airborne without a ground
crew and an air traffic controller, a physician often
relies significantly on nurses, technicians, and pharmacists to cooperate in his treatment plan. In the hospital
or other institutional setting, even more personnel are
likely to be added to constitute a caregiving team.
Aviation was not always safe; its early years were
hazardous, and the perception has remained—in spite of
fatality statistics—that flying is a more serious proposition
than riding in a car. But the industry, recognizing safety as
necessary for acceptance and growth, has steadily tried to
improve. A collective goal of safe skies is aided by the
natural alignment of incentives: pilot, crew, airline, and
manufacturer all lose if a plane crashes.
Successful flights rest on attention to order and
detail, an organized system that promotes teamwork, and
a willingness to learn from mistakes. Error reduction in
aviation is credited to several elements: establishment of
an error reporting system, encouragement to pilots and
other crew members to report errors and incidents, and
a focus on teamwork training. A highlight is the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), a confidential
system for reporting incidents (cases that violated good
practice or established rules but did not result in an
accident—“near misses”), analyzing their root causes,
and communicating conclusions to those directly
involved and to others who might face a similar situation. The ASRS receives about 30,000 reports per year.
The ASRS is funded largely by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), but operates independently. It
was developed to replace a less successful predecessor
within the FAA. Because the FAA is a regulatory and
enforcement agency, reports to it were constrained by
fear of punishment for errors. The ASRS, besides being
independent, was designed from the beginning to be

entirely confidential. Those reporting incidents are
granted immunity from retaliation. (It should be noted that
accidents involving passenger injury or damage to aircraft
are reported to and investigated by the National Transportation Safety Board, a different process altogether.)
Before ASRS reports are analyzed and entered into the
database, identifying information is removed. The database is available to researchers. ASRS regularly communicates with the industry, reporting individual events and
analyses of the larger problems they may point to.
Charles Billings, M.D., who developed the ASRS,
offered specific guidance to the medical community
during a conference on medical error sponsored by the
Annenberg Center for Health Sciences, the Association
for the Advancement of Science, the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations
(JCAHO), and the American Medical Association
(AMA) in 1996. Billings stressed the importance of
consensus among all stakeholders during system design
and of keeping the system’s operations objective and
free of control by one or more stakeholders. The ASRS
is voluntary, which Billings recommended, observing
that “in one way or another, all incident reporting
becomes voluntary,” whether through inertia, gaming, or
failure of the regulatory fine print to cover every eventuality. He also emphasized the importance of qualified
analysis (for example, pilots who rotate through a period
of service with the ASRS are expected to maintain their
flying experience) and research capabilities.
Benefits of an external reporting system, as opposed
to an in-house process, include a larger sample size and
thus potentially the ability to spot patterns not discernible
in a smaller sphere, resident expertise in data interpretation and human factors analysis, and wider feedback.
Another area in which comparisons between pilots
and physicians may be instructive is training. A concrete
illustration of adaptable teamwork training is provided
by Dynamics Research Corporation, which developed
an aircrew coordination training program for the U.S.
Army. As will be described, this program moves the
focus for aircraft operations away from the single-pilot
model to a perspective in which the entire crew is
responsible for effective operations. The training does
not relieve the pilot-in-command of responsibility but
does empower other crew members to get information,
make recommendations, and actively intervene.
The payoffs from this training program for army
aviation—an estimated 40 percent reduction in safetyrelated errors—prompted the army to investigate
whether the behavioral approach used in aviation would
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translate into other high-performance, high-stress team
environments. Working with a group of 11 hospitals,
both military and civilian, Dynamics Research has
completed validation testing of its MedTeams module
for emergency department personnel and plans to
expand this to other medical team environments.
In considering a national error reporting system for
health care, planners would have to address the question
of volume. Leape has estimated that the reporting of
only one-tenth of the medical “near misses” that occur
annually would result in from 280,000 to over 1 million
reports. Already operating is a segment-based reporting
mechanism designed on ASRS principles, JCAHO’s
“sentinel events” program (discussed below), which
received approximately 400 reports in 1998.
Another issue is closing the loop from analysis back
to practice. The ASRS is successful in part because it is
housed in an agency that has the authority to act on
analysts’ conclusions and that can require procedural
changes. And pilots may have stronger incentives than
physicians to keep their skills sharpened. For one thing,
their own lives are on the line. Second, they are required
to be recertified periodically, an active demonstration of
ability rather than the more passive review of licenses
and records that constitutes physician recredentialing by
network managers or managed care organizations.

ERROR REDUCTION INITIATIVES
The level of attention paid to the problem of medical
errors has accelerated markedly in recent years, with
research and discussion leading to a number of improvement initiatives in both the public and private sectors.
Several large employers, including Motorola and
General Electric (GE), have adopted a “Six Sigma”
program to boost quality in all their operations. The
name refers to the symbol used to indicate standard
deviation from a normal distribution; six sigma, or six
standard deviations, corresponds to a target error rate of
3.4 defects per million units or occurrences. Originally
applied to manufacturing processes—only 3.4 defective
widgets in every million coming off the line—the
approach has been extended to services as well. In
health care, the vision would be, for example, that no
more than 3.4 of 1 million patients fail to be given a
prescription for beta blockers following a heart attack.
In that the National Committee for Quality Assurance
reported a national average of 61.9 percent of such
patients actually receiving a beta blocker prescription—that is, 381,000 per million are not—it is clear
that health care has a long way to go.9

Still, recognition of the amplitude of errors is a
necessary step toward improving them, and the Six
Sigma companies are determined to persist. Charles R.
Buck of GE has observed:
A commitment to quality is every bit as much a cultural
commitment as it is a set of quantitative tools and
methods. The organizational culture facilitates many
critical aspects of quality improvement. A quality
culture makes it OK to seek out (yes, seek out!) mistakes
or defects as opportunities for improvement.10

Other groups are committed to error reduction as
well. The Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI)
sponsors courses, conferences, and collaborative
projects among health care organizations that will lead
to measurable improvement in patient care. A year-long
collaborative project on medication error reduction,
chaired by Leape in 1996-97, focused the efforts of 40
organizations on documenting improvement in areas
such as chemotherapy safety, standardization of medication processes, and safe handling of lethal drugs. IHI
is also working with the Innovation Institute to look at
models of adult learning and retraining that may help
people to look at their work processes in a new way.
The American Society of Health-System Pharmacists (ASHP) convened an expert panel to study ways
that practitioners and institutions could reduce the
incidence of adverse drug events; seven “top-priority”
recommendations were published with the group’s
endorsement in 1996.11 AHSP also develops and makes
available online therapeutic guidelines, including the
recent “Safe Use of Automated Medication Storage and
Distribution Devices.”
In response to the 1996 Annenberg Conference on
medical error referenced earlier, the AMA established
the National Patient Safety Foundation (NPSF). The
foundation is an independent, not-for-profit organization that serves as a forum for a variety of stakeholders
(health care providers, consumer advocates, health
product manufacturers, researchers, purchasers, and
regulators) to explore the issues surrounding and
impediments to patient safety. Its core mission is built
on research, prevention and implementation, communication and trust-building, and education. The NPSF was
an important participant in a second Annenberg Conference on medical error held in November 1998.
JCAHO has accredited hospitals since its founding
by the American College of Surgeons, AMA, the
American Hospital Association (AHA), the American
College of Physicians, and the Canadian Medical
Association in 1951; it has added other types of medical
facilities and organizations (for example, home health
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agencies, and managed care networks) in subsequent
years. For some years, JCAHO has employed a sentinel
event policy for error reporting, which requires
JCAHO-accredited health care facilities to investigate
“any unexpected occurrence involving death or serious
physical or psychological injury, or the risk thereof.”12
Any time such a sentinel event occurs, the facility is
expected to complete a thorough root cause analysis,
implement improvements to reduce risk, and monitor
the effectiveness of these improvements. Additionally,
there is a subset of sentinel events—those that actually
result in harm—that accredited organizations are asked
to report to the joint commission database.
Originally, the reporting of a sentinel event triggered
an immediate review by JCAHO investigators and
placing of the facility on probation, signaling a problem
to all observers. In 1998, the joint commission revised
its policy to give reporting organizations time to conduct
their own reviews and implement corrective measures
before JCAHO’s taking any action. If the institution
submits the results of this process to JCAHO within 30
days, it is not subject to “accreditation watch.” On-site
review by JCAHO personnel is ordered only if a potential ongoing threat to patient safety is determined still to
be present.
In the absence of federal law protecting against
public disclosure and potential punitive action, reporting of sentinel events is and will likely remain voluntary. However, even an institution that chooses not to
report is required to conduct and share with the joint
commission information concerning a root cause
analysis and a plan for correction within 45 days.
Organizations that do not comply or that refuse to share
such information will be placed on accreditation watch
and risk the loss of accreditation altogether.
The new level of autonomy is expected to encourage
self-reporting, since it provides “the opportunity to
substitute organizational learning for embarrassment.”13
Concerns about the confidentiality of sentinel-event
information submitted to JCAHO remain, although (as
communicated in an October 1998 “Dear Colleague”
letter from president Dennis S. O’Leary, M.D.) the joint
commission has appointed a legal issues task force and
suggested prudent steps—such as naming JCAHO as a
participant in the internal quality review process—for
institutions to follow. It also intends to continue its pursuit
of federal and state law protections for the confidentiality
of information shared with accrediting bodies.
The Veterans Health Administration of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), as part of system-wide

restructuring inaugurated in 1995, has implemented a
patient safety improvement initiative. A key element
(operating since June 1997) is a centralized patient safety
registry and reporting system, which incorporates a
patient safety handbook, a field-to-headquarters reporting
system for sentinel events and near misses, a requirement
to conduct root cause analyses, and an interdisciplinary
review team that provides feedback to reporting facilities
and information to the rest of the VA system.
In October 1997, the VA also established the National
Patient Safety Partnership, whose founding members
include the VA, the AMA, the AHA, the American
Nurses Association, the Association of American Medical
Colleges, JCAHO, the Institute for Healthcare Improvement, and the National Patient Safety Foundation, along
with agencies such as the Food and Drug Administration,
the Health Care Financing Administration, and the
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research. This
public-private partnership is dedicated to “improving
patient safety by reducing adverse events and untoward
outcomes of healthcare or healthcare related processes.”
The partnership is working with its member organizations
to develop a compendium of best practices for reducing
adverse drug events and plans to call on physicians, other
health care practitioners, health care systems, and the
pharmaceutical industry to adopt them.
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Modernization Act of 1997 authorized as a demonstration
project the creation of Centers for Education and
Research on Therapeutics (CERTS) under the aegis of
AHCPR in collaboration with the FDA. As well as
looking at new products and ways to improve their
effective use, the centers’ purpose, in the language of
the conference report, is “to increase awareness of risks
of both new uses and combinations of therapies,” and,
more generally, to educate the practitioner community.
The CERTS charter includes error reduction research
and education.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
It is only recently that the medical professions began
to acknowledge how much they do not know and,
indeed, the limits on how much a person can know or
how perfect a performance can be reasonably expected.
Mount Sinai School of Medicine professor Mark
Chassin (also co-chair of the Institute of Medicine’s
National Roundtable on Health Care Quality), has
observed that “we have created systems that depend
upon idealized standards of performance that require
individual physicians, nurses, and pharmacists to
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perform tasks at levels of perfection that cannot be
achieved by human beings.” Some who agree with him
are trying to institute change, but it is difficult to know
how far beyond a cadre of dedicated proponents their
message extends. As consumers and the popular press
continue to focus on benefits, regarding denial of a
service as poor-quality care, the need for redesigning
systems and retraining medical professionals attracts
little public attention.
And when a mistake is made, a patient harmed, a
common response is a desire to sue. This is reflected in
debates about liability, where the question is less
whether wronged patients should be able to sue someone than who should be included in the range of liable
parties and what recompense the patient is owed.
Changing the culture of “someone must pay” could
prove a Herculean task.
A medical-error case frequently cited is the 1994 death
of Boston Globe columnist Betsy Lehman from a chemotherapy overdose administered in the Dana-Farber Cancer
Institute. In January 1999, a Massachusetts licensing
body, the Board of Registration in Nursing, decided to
pursue disciplinary action against the nurses involved in
the case. Although the nurses were exonerated by DanaFarber and JCAHO, the board determined that they
should have questioned the orders they were given by
physicians. Dana-Farber president David G. Nathan,
M.D., defended the nurses’ standards of practice, blaming
an ambiguous treatment protocol and noting that the
institute had adopted a wide range of corrective actions
since the incident.14 (Leape, in an editorial published in
the January 12 edition of the Boston Globe, called the
board’s decision “misguided, inappropriate, and harmful,” and praised Dana-Farber for holding the institution,
not the nurses, accountable for Lehman’s death.)
This example illustrates the “sides” to the medical
error issue. Clearly, no one is suggesting that reducing
errors is anything but desirable. However, significant
resistance to openness about errors has grown up in a
climate where shame and retribution have been visited
on those judged to have erred. The traditional view has
been that punishment is an effective deterrent to others
who might be careless, but many medical personnel
have come to believe that relying on punishment stifles
willingness to address errors and ability to correct them
and in effect serves as an incentive to conceal them.
If elements of the medical professions still are
operating under the “someone must pay” approach, it is
not surprising if many consumers feel the same. Perhaps consumers need to be better informed on what

causes errors and how their own alertness might contribute to safety. But it is difficult to know what specific
information to provide them. Hospitals are unlikely to
announce the number of near misses for the quarter, nor
to publish infection rates for a consumer to use as a
basis of comparison. Many feel that a necessary first
step is building consumer awareness that a problem
exists. Proponents of the new system-based thinking
also are pondering how consumers might learn to draw
a distinction between negligent acts that result in harm
and errors that cause harm but are not a matter of
individual fault.
As purchasers as well as regulators of health care,
federal agencies and lawmakers may choose to play a
role in error reduction. A number of options have been
proposed in discussions among analysts. For example,
it has been suggested that the FDA look at standards for
drug naming, labeling, and packaging. AHCPR, which
already funds research evaluating various treatments
and technologies, might undertake an error-reduction
initiative. Under S. 300, introduced January 22,
AHCPR’s CERTS program would be made permanent.
Some hope the National Patient Safety Partnership’s
best practices, when published, may be reflected in
government contracts.

THE FORUM SESSION
In this Forum session, Lucian L. Leape, M.D.,
adjunct professor at the Harvard School of Public Health
and a leading researcher on the subject of medical error
reduction, will review his findings on the causes and
correctives of medical error and share his thoughts on
action needed at a policy level to advance the improvement process. Robert Simon, Ed.D., C.P.E., chief
scientist, Crew Performance Group, Dynamics Research
Corporation, will describe how his team has taken the
error-reduction strategies they developed for aviation and
applied them to medical care. Kenneth Kizer, M.D.,
undersecretary for health in the Department of Veterans
Affairs will talk about his agency’s patient safety initiatives. Sen. Bill Frist (R-Tenn.) will offer his unique
perspective—as lawmaker, physician, and pilot—on
safety strategies and policy directions.

Issue Questions
The discussion will incorporate the following
questions:



What steps might hospitals or other facilities take in
attempting to reduce error systematically?
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How can data best be marshaled to enable errorreduction programs?

9. The National Committee for Quality Assurance, “The
State of Managed Care Quality,” Washington, D.C., October
1998.

What technology would assist in reducing medical
errors?

10. Charles R. Buck, “Health Care through a Six Sigma
Lens,” The Milbank Quarterly, 76, no. 4: 749-753.

Is there a bright line between preventable (errorcaused) and nonpreventable accidents? Is some
residual level of error inevitable? What is an “acceptable” margin of error?

11. American Society of Health-System Pharmacists, “Toppriority actions for preventing adverse drug events in hospitals,” American Journal of Health-System Pharmacy, April 1,
1996.

Do providers need explicit protections, such as
guaranteed anonymity, to encourage them to report
errors quickly and candidly?

12. Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care
Organizations, “Facts about the Sentinel Event Policy,”
Oakbrook Terrace, Illinois, May 1998.

Should hospitals and other facilities be responsible
for compensating patients for damage due to error?

13. Lucian L. Leape, “Promoting Patient Safety by Preventing
Medical Error,” Journal of the American Medical Association, 280, no. 16 (October 28, 1998): 1444-47.

Is there a role for consumers in medical error reduction? How can consumers best be educated on this
issue before they become patients?
In what ways might government need to play a
different or stronger role?
What are the appropriate public- and private-sector
roles in error reduction?
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